Kamil Galeevの分析する「ロシアはなぜ負けている」のか･･･4月6日現在のウクライナ

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Why Russia is losing this war? First I'll discuss why Russia *is* losing. Then I'll give my version of how it could happen. The key to understanding lies in the Soviet/Russian military doctrine. It gives context for current events and helps to predict further Russian actions🧵 pic.twitter.com/uQqYVLENwe

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Maps of Russian Federal News Agency show a massive retreat. Apparently, Russia abandoned its initial plans to capture Kyiv and take control of Ukraine. Thus political goals of Z-operation can't be achieved. Regime change and (partial?) annexation of Ukraine are not gonna happen pic.twitter.com/pDDxsx1mIr

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

What is even more interesting, the tone of description has changed . As you see, until April 2 they had been posting maps of "successes (успехи) of the Special Operation". Since April 2 - of its "execution" (проведение). Indeed, this rapid retreat doesn't allow to claim success pic.twitter.com/ttSmXXseTN

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

How did Russians explain the retreat? Colonel General Fomin told: "We decided to radically, for several times decrease our military activities on Kyiv and Chernihiv directions. We assume that Kyiv will take corresponding decisions and create conditions for future cooperation" pic.twitter.com/GovSeMAGRZ

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

That doesn't mean deescalation however. PRmaxer Shoygu reported that the first stage of Special Operation is "successfully completed". Military capacities of Ukrainian army weakened and thus Russia can concentrate its effort on its main goal - "liberation of Donbass" pic.twitter.com/N5r80f0rn2

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Some already congratulated Russia with its success, concluding that "the goals of Special Operation were more limited than we had thought". That's a textbook copium. The initially declared Z-goal has not been achieved, thus whatever has been achieved is portrayed as the real goal pic.twitter.com/b9IAIwYnR2

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Many pro-Russian observers argue that the retreat from the North is a genius move: Russians are regrouping for a major assault in the East. That's not wrong. Indeed, Russians *will* attack in the East, in Donbass. However, these analysts seem to make virtue out of a necessity pic.twitter.com/yTRzwEVO3z

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Russian retreat from the North doesn't look as a premeditated move. I don't have data but judging from the photos of abandoned Russian vehicles t.me/russian_losses they are fleeing leaving whatever that can't move fast: artillery, rocket launchers, air defense systems pic.twitter.com/TVvRJjkB5Z

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

How could it happen? To answer this question, we'll need to figure out how did the hostilities go *before* the Russian retreat. What territory did the Russians control? Analysts mocked such "just the roads" maps of Russian-controlled territory as an obvious pro-Ukrainian copium pic.twitter.com/Yrx1wxZ6K0

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

And yet, "just the roads" maps were quite accurate and the analysts were wrong. Strelkov debunks "contiguous territory" myth and argues that at least in the North Russians controlled only the "long narrow appendixes along the roads". Russian, indeed, controlled "just the roads" pic.twitter.com/2EqpBVmdXk

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

According to Strelkov, Russians didn't control the territory between the northern highways and haven't isolated cities like Chernihiv and Sumy. Thus they risked repeating a scenario of the Winter War 1940 when much smaller Finnish forces isolated and decimated the Soviet invaders pic.twitter.com/uZOF6U5BIb

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Finns destroyed the Soviet troops using guerilla tactics in winter. Ukrainians will soon have an advantage of using similar tactics in summer, during зеленка, "the green". Trees being covered with leaves will give an upper hand to the Ukrainian guerillas over the Russian regulars pic.twitter.com/ANTDIrQbXY

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Strelkov concludes that Russians have no choice but to retreat from the North in order to regroup and attack again in Donbass (you see Russians retreating from the Sumy area. On this northeastern direction Russian retreat seems to be more organised than in Kyiv or Chernyhiv) pic.twitter.com/k08Uorw8gz

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

"But honestly I doubt that after losing the golden first month of the war, our troops will manage to surround and destroy the Ukrainian force in Donbass. Unfortunately I see that Ukrainian military commandment is acting an order of magnitude more competently than the Russian one" pic.twitter.com/d1gj7jtkU6

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

How could it happen? How could seemingly so much superior Russian army fail in Ukraine miserably? Of course, many argue it didn't fail at all. Coincidentally, those very people usually predicted a Ukrainian collapse within few days or weeks. Now they convenienty forgot it ofc pic.twitter.com/K0XdWOiUU4

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

The failure of many analysts to correctly predict the course of Z-war resulted from three factors. First, they greatly overestimated (or rather misunderstood) the Russian-Soviet army. Second, they underestimated the Ukrainian one. Third, they ignored the Russian political goals

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Russian army is just superficially reformed Soviet army. And the Soviet army was a multitask tool designed for: 1. Winning the nuclear war 2. Picking potatoes 3. Pacifying satellite states Consider that multitask tools are usually not *that* great in either of their functions pic.twitter.com/iwTOG140ZL

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Soviet army was designed for the nuclear war. Thus all the army branches were developed for the war that would involve mass employment of nukes. Which is completely different from a conventional war. Let me illustrate this difference on example of a Soviet IFV - БМП-1 pic.twitter.com/gkAmHnEZWx

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

БМП-1 has been the most common IFV in the Soviet/Russian army. It also has been the most deeply hated one. While its abbreviation БМП means Боевая машина пехоты (Fighting vehicle of the infantry), frontline soldiers called it Братская могила пехоты (Mass grave of the infantry) pic.twitter.com/kcaBORRKSs

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Both in Afghanistan and in Chechnya soldiers preferred to ride on the armor rather than inside. Why? Well, the armor gave enough protection from light weaponry, especially from the front. But the armor on the sides was so weak that machines guns or shell fragments often broke it pic.twitter.com/YfLwRAzgBy

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

What is worse БМП-1 offered almost zero protection from the high explosive projectiles or from the land mines. In case of mine explosion, soldiers wouldn't be able to get out and would burn alive inside. Why? Largely because it was not ergonomic at all. It was incredibly cramped pic.twitter.com/0LRwdVGU8p