【質問】 核戦争に至るまでのメカニズムやシナリオについて教えてください.
- KCin_Tokorozawa
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Executive Director @GCRInstitute. Affiliate @CSERCambridge. Tweets my own. Mastodon: @sethbaum@mastodon.world
So lots of people are interested in the probability of nuclear war right now. I have studied the probability of nuclear war about as much as anyone (e.g., lead author on the model in the graphic shown below). Here are my thoughts. pic.twitter.com/WwaJC85LfZ
2022-10-10 05:36:321) There isn’t going to be any clarity on how large the probability is. It’s too opaque, too complex, too fast-moving. 2) In this instance, it’s OK to lack clarity on the probability. Sound policy & decision-making can proceed regardless, and that’s the important part.
2022-10-10 05:36:333) I am especially worried about endgame scenarios in which Ukraine keeps winning and Russia/Putin run out of other options. Here are my preliminary thoughts on how to reduce nuclear war risk in those scenarios: twitter.com/SethBaum/statu…
2022-10-10 05:36:34If Ukraine continues to retake territory, how can we dissuade Russia from escalating to nuclear? Prior thread discussed international condemnation. That’s a stick. Here, a quick attempt at listing out a wider range of carrots & sticks. twitter.com/SethBaum/statu…
2022-10-09 20:51:42The endgame scenarios worry me because Russia/Putin may have incentive for nuclear attack. They’ve put so much on the line, it’s hard to just walk away. In that regard, the current moment is more worrisome than even the Cuban missile crisis—though let’s let the historians judge.
2022-10-10 05:36:34The Cuban missile crisis is one of many nuclear war “near-miss” events. A detailed accounting of such events from 1945 through 2018 is in my paper “A Model For The Probability Of Nuclear War”: gcrinstitute.org/a-model-for-th…
2022-10-10 05:36:35The rest of my nuclear war work is in the link below. The field of nuclear war risk analysis is not large, so for me to claim to be a top scholar on it isn’t saying much. But I still stand my expertise and my comments here. Now for some details. gcrinstitute.org/nuclear
2022-10-10 05:36:36Point #1: The probability of nuclear war is quantifiable, but only under certain forms of probability theory, especially subjective/Bayesian probability theory, in which probability is “quantification of a personal belief” en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_…
2022-10-10 05:36:36This from @russianforces only makes sense under frequentist probability theory, which is very limited. Compare to estimates of the probability of your sports team winning the next championship—which is also a unique event. That’s subjective probability. twitter.com/russianforces/…
2022-10-10 05:36:37This is utterly ridiculous. Probability is a wrong concept to apply to a unique event. These diagrams are garbage twitter.com/tegmark/status…
2022-10-10 02:13:12In other words, if we accept the validity of estimates of the probability of sports teams winning championships, then we have to also accept the validity of estimates of the probability of nuclear war. Both are subjective judgments of novel events.
2022-10-10 05:36:37Next: Attempts to estimate the probability are highly uncertain and should be viewed skeptically. All such estimations are, one way or another, some person’s best guess. For this sort of parameter, best guess judgments are unreliable. See: pnas.org/doi/abs/10.107…
2022-10-10 05:36:38People’s probability estimates are reliable when they have lots of practice. Example: weather forecasters. If they say 20% chance of rain on 100 days, it probably rains on about 20 of those days. Nuclear war is not like this. We don’t have lots of practice—fortunately!
2022-10-10 05:36:38Next: Knowledgeable experts are likely to disagree, and it’s very difficult to resolve who’s right. For example, @BrunoTertrais finds a relatively low probability. I have read his scholarship and can say his thinking is very well-informed. twitter.com/BrunoTertrais/…
2022-10-10 05:36:39That remains a value judgment based on very few facts or solid arguments. At worse, I’d say has moved from almost zero to highly improbable. But thank you for your expertise. twitter.com/elonmusk/statu…
2022-10-10 02:35:44For comparison, here @Stanovaya suggests a relatively high probability: “If these demands are not met—and it is safe to say they will not be—Russia will resort to the nuclear option”. The “will resort” seems too deterministic but suggests high probability foreignaffairs.com/russian-federa…
2022-10-10 05:36:39There is a theoretical argument that disagreement between experts is fundamentally resolvable, resulting in everyone having the same probability estimate. However, in practice, this is at best a slow process—too slow for immediate purposes en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aumann%27…
2022-10-10 05:36:40I wouldn’t take much from the @tegmark probability numbers for the above reasons. Also, his model only accounts for one specific nuclear war scenario. A full accounting of the probability should cover all scenarios. twitter.com/tegmark/status…
2022-10-10 05:36:40Here's why I think there's now a one-in-six chance of an imminent global #NuclearWar, and why I appreciate @elonmusk and others urging de-escalation, which is IMHO in the national security interest of all nations: lesswrong.com/posts/Dod9AWz8… pic.twitter.com/kZtTCVhzZu
2022-10-09 09:52:40For example, @tegmark assumes the first strike is Russia attacking Ukraine, but there is reason to believe the first strike could instead be Russia attacking NATO. To wit: twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews…
2022-10-10 05:36:41There was palpable frustration in the Russian media that many in the West misunderstood what Putin said—he was threatening the West, not Ukraine, with nuclear strikes. And so, droves of propagandists have been sent out to tell the West: push us into a corner and everybody dies. pic.twitter.com/quXcMZd7SE
2022-09-23 09:29:22There are also scenarios involving accidental/unintended nuclear weapons launch. This is the bottom (blue) half of my nuclear war probability model: pic.twitter.com/BD00aDhbVO
2022-10-10 05:36:42You might wonder, where do I stand on the probability? Instead of getting caught up on numbers, I am focused on the practical implications. I’m not yet at “head for the hills”, but there still is a significant risk that demands attention. twitter.com/SethBaum/statu…
2022-10-10 05:36:43What’s the probability of nuclear war from the war in Ukraine? This thread compiles notes+links on the underlying fundamentals In sum: it looks like nuclear war is probably not imminent, but it’s a nervous moment & it seems likely to get worse before it (hopefully) gets better
2022-10-05 08:35:42Things can change rapidly, but for now, the situation is still not completely terrible as @pwnallthethings points out. Perhaps we’ll learn more soon regarding Russia’s response to the Kerch attack. I am not qualified to make predictions on that. twitter.com/pwnallthething…
2022-10-10 05:36:43Should probably write this in longer form somewhere else, but the Russian response to the Crimean bridge attack is, I think, instructive as to just how far away the Kremlin is from internally preparing or even yet considering a practical escalation into nuclear use.
2022-10-09 09:47:42Meanwhile, whatever the probability may be, we should actively try to reduce it. That's the take-away message, and it doesn't depend on exact probability numbers. My preliminary thoughts on how to do so are below; all are encouraged to contribute. twitter.com/SethBaum/statu…
2022-10-10 05:36:44UPDATE: Some reactions to the new Russian missile attacks on Ukraine here: twitter.com/SethBaum/statu…
2022-10-10 23:48:08My immediate, tentative reaction to the new Russian missile attacks: (1) a step closer to a dark endgame, though not necessarily a large step; (2) no new implications for how to reduce the risk of nuclear war. This thread shares some experts whom I am relying on for the above.
2022-10-10 23:46:28Update: Here is a thread of threads, if you’d like to see all of the various threads I’ve been posting. twitter.com/SethBaum/statu…
2022-10-13 22:20:14Thread of threads—below is a compilation of my recent Twitter threads, mostly but not exclusively related to Ukraine & nuclear war. I plan to keep this updated. First: Underlying fundamentals of the nuclear war risk. The thread's conclusions still hold. twitter.com/SethBaum/statu…
2022-10-13 22:13:00@SethBaum As someone who has studied probability theory for decades, I just wanted to say I think this thread is outstanding. Well done!
2022-10-11 00:54:55