Kamil Galeev氏の「ロシアはなぜ負けているのか？」：4月6日の戦況分析

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

What is in common between Z-Operation and Danube? Well, first, their political goals. In both cases Moscow was discontent with the political leadership of an Eastern European country and with its too free and deregulated political life. That was unacceptable and had to be stopped pic.twitter.com/QUQ0nwnZAm

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Both in Czechoslovakia and in Ukraine Moscow intended to stop "chaos" (=deregulated political life) in a perceived satellite state by force via a police operation. This police operation had to be conducted by the army but very quickly, with minimal resistance and minimal shooting pic.twitter.com/HIACcfnE2k

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

To minimise resistance your invasion should be unexpected. That's why preparation for invasion was both times disguised by "manoeuvres". Z-invasion - by "Union Resolve" in Belarus, "Danube" - by "Neman" manoeuvres which allowed to lowkey amass huge forces on Czechoslovak border pic.twitter.com/wyEJVjtA3N

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Both in 1968 and in 2022 soldiers didn't know where they're going. Even their commanders didn't know. Immediately before the invasion commanders received a radio command "Vltava-666" which meant they should unpack a sealed mail with a secret order and execute it immediately pic.twitter.com/pcN8u8LShc

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Both in Czechoslovakia 1968 and in Ukraine 2022 occupiers would have problems with distinguishing their vehicles from those of the occupied. Thus in 2022 they marked their vehicles with "Z", "V", "O" etc and in 1968 - with a white stripe. That was to distinguish *us* from *them* pic.twitter.com/WQKOwbwzgo

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

In Czechoslovakia they ordered to neutralize any local military vehicles without white stripes and to destroy them if they resisted. Meanwhile Soviets were absolutely prohibited from attacking NATO forces if they encounter them. It's likely similar instructions were given in 2022 pic.twitter.com/bLcJ2msMW9

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Both Danube and Z-operation started with VDV attacking airports. In 1968 a Soviet transport plane asked for emergency landing in Prague because of an "accident". They allowed it. Plane landed, VDV disembarked and captured the airport to allow other invaders to disembark smoothly pic.twitter.com/1wOxOM9Ct8

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Z-operation started in a very similar way. Operation started with bombings and with Russian VDV disembarking their paratroopers in key airports. Here you see them attacking Hostomel airport near Kyiv. And yet, here you see the major difference: Ukrainains immediately opened fire pic.twitter.com/pi2rOB3JR2

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

That's the initial airborne attack on a Ukrainian airport from the Russian POV. As you see, on its initial stages Z-operation went similar to the Danube, just with massive use of transport helicopters: take control over the airports and them bring more troops by the air pic.twitter.com/bwgqELmrnY

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

But the air attack during Z-operation turned out much worse for Moscow than the Danube. Ukrainians were more prepared to face Russian VDVs. After all, paratroopers are essentially a glorified police force unable to stand against the regular army. No wonder they were destroyed pic.twitter.com/UloTWFExKz

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Although the land invasion 2022 was modelled after 1968, it was worse prepared. In 1968 Czechoslovakia was attacked by an enormous force of 500 000 coming in two echelons. First echelon of 250 000 pushes forward, second one come next, occupies territory and secures supply lines pic.twitter.com/wIG0l6iNUr

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Z-invasion proceeded with far smaller force. Only 160-190 thousand Russian soldiers crossed the border with Ukraine in late Feb. Like in 1968, they pushed forward. But no second echelon came to occupy territory behind the first and secure the supply lines. Because it didn't exist pic.twitter.com/ZyXDuAd2dT

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Putin didn't expect resistance thinking Ukrainians would just run surrender. Putin and some Western analysts underestimated the cultural impact of Donbass catastrophe that obliterated pro-Russian sentiments in East Ukraine. Russian rule in Donbass turned out to be the nightmare pic.twitter.com/H9IR0Yk4g8

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Even the Russian official propaganda admits that Russians misjudged the mass sentiments in Ukraine. They wrongly believed that Ukrainians are just Russians and Ukrainians independence is just farcical. Meanwhile, they unexpectedly met a bitter and determined resistance pic.twitter.com/0afLbmTPyv

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Danube-styled invasion with much smaller force was a mistake. Why? Because Ukrainians saw it coming. They prepared for the guerrilla war and for operating in a deep rear of the enemy. The entire concept of territorial troops modelled after Poland was aimed to this type of war pic.twitter.com/j1QiiSOhpJ

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Z-army pushing forward and leaving the unoccupied territory behind gave an opportunity to launch exactly that type of warfare Ukrainians had been preparing for. As a result they started a full scale guerrilla war ravaging Russian supply convoys and army columns. Watch this video: pic.twitter.com/OV55Hxi3fl

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Another surprise was how difficult it is to assault positions in cities and especially in industrial landscapes when their defenders are resolved to fight. Even extremely heavy bombardment leaves enough defenders alive to keep fighting. Mariupol proved that better than anything pic.twitter.com/bviOuIIjsd

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Russian sources give grim picture of the WWI-style war in East Ukraine. Z-forces do frontline attacks on fortified Ukrainian positions again and again. They suffer huge losses with almost no progress, but commanders keep sending them in frontline attacks. As Strelkov points out: pic.twitter.com/SGLimkPnBM

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Now whom are Russians sending to these frontline attacks? Well, the Donbass people. They do "total mobilisation" in Donetsk and Luhansk and send these guys to frontline attacks. That's very smart. They're not Russian soldiers, so you can keep official casualty numbers low

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Btw: that's how the Donbass levy looks like. These miserably looking guys bear the main burden of war in the East from the Russian side. Compare them with the heavily equipped Kadyrov's TikTok soldiers. NB: Those who look great do not fight, those who do fight, do not look great pic.twitter.com/WEeddu497n

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

The might of the Russian army had been wildly overestimated. Meanwhile the strength of the Ukrainian one was just as wildly underestimated. Even Strelkov grudgingly admitted that "Ukrainian military commandment is acting an order of magnitude more competently than the Russians" pic.twitter.com/5Zly2G5owy

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Consider a case when two Ukrainian helicopters evacuating the wounded from besieged Mariupol were shot down by Russians. Russian sources suggest that this evacuation wasn't incidental. Ukrainians had been systematically supplying the besieged city by air, unnoticed by Russians pic.twitter.com/HhUehTuNaq

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

"They had an established route unnoticed by our air Defense. They were brining ammo to Mariupol and the wounded from it. They were flying on a miminal height around 10 meters. They were avoiding settlements, turning to the Above sea and then to the Mariupol seaport"

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

"They could bring up to 12 tons of ammo when going to Mariupol and evacuate up to 60 wounded soldiers on a way back. We don't know how many times did they repeat it. This time they were unlucky to accidentally meet a patrol with a man-portable air-defence system on a way back"

Kamil Galeev @kamilkazani

Sounds crazy, doesn't it? If true, it suggests extremely high level of both competence and morale, far exceeding the one that can be found within the Russian army. It means that the Ukrainians went through a fundamental reform since 2014 - and [almost] nobody managed to notice it